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South Korea’s Middle East Policy
Alon Levkowitz
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
South Korea’s relations with the Middle East have changed throughout 
the years, from passive and indifferent to extensive and diverse. In the 
1950s, South Korea’s top interests did not include the Middle East, 
but with the development of the South Korean economy, the region’s 
significance to Seoul increased markedly. South Korea must cope with a 
Middle East that offers billions of dollars’ worth of contracts for South 
Korean companies and, at the same time, is unstable due to wars and 
domestic turmoil. 
South Korea’s Middle East policy balances political neutrality with a 
cautious policy towards Israel, as Seoul is concerned that political 
support for Israel will jeopardize its positive standing in the Middle East. 
The billions of dollars of contracts with the Middle East, mainly the 
Persian Gulf states, are too important for Seoul to risk on Israel. Military 
cooperation between the two countries has grown significantly, and will 
continue to improve as long as the United States does not constrain it.

The author, a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is an expert on East 
Asian security, the Korean Peninsula, and Asian international organizations.
South Korea’s Middle East Policy
Alon Levkowitz
INTRODUCTION
South Korea’s relations with the Middle East have changed throughout 
the years, from passive and indifferent to extensive and diverse. In the 
1950s, South Korea’s top interests did not include the Middle East, 
but with the development of the South Korean economy, the region’s 
significance to Seoul increased markedly.
This study will analyze the changes in South Korea’s foreign policy towards 
the Middle East, and discuss the factors and constraints that have influenced 
these policies throughout the years. It will also explain how South Korea 
copes with a Middle East that offers billions of dollars’ worth of contracts 
for South Korean companies and, at the same time, is unstable due to wars 
and domestic turmoil. This study will also discuss Seoul’s policies towards 
the Middle East, which balance local and global interests.
South Korea-Middle East relations deserve greater attention. The 
academic literature and media coverage have focused on the security 
relations between North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, particularly on nuclear 
and missile cooperation between these states, while disregarding South 
Korea’s relationship with the latter two states. The huge disparity between 
South Korea and North Korea’s trade with the Middle East also indicates 
the need to address South Korea-Middle East relations.1 For example, in 
2011 North Korea’s total global foreign trade (export and import) was 
$9.03 billion.2 That same year, the bilateral trade between South Korea 
and Iran alone was $17.4 billion.3 Another economic factor is the rising 
number of South Korean companies doing business in the Middle East, 
mainly in the Persian Gulf, while there are no North Korean companies 
working in the region. The development of the South Korean economy 
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increased the Middle East’s importance to Seoul, due to an increasing 
need for oil and gas imports from the Persian Gulf. 4 Table 1 demonstrates 
the economic importance of the Middle East states for South Korea, in 
comparison to other states in different regions. This study discusses how 
the South Korean government has handled the “Arab Spring” and Iranian 
nuclear crises.
TABLE 1: SOUTH KOREA’S BILATERAL TRADE IN 2012 ($ BILLION)5
China US  SaudiArabia Russia Germany India Iran UK France
215 101.8 48.8 22.4 21.6 20.6 14.7 11.2 7.5
Part one of this study briefly presents the internal and external constraints 
that influence South Korea’s Middle East policy. Part two discusses the 
security relations between South Korea and the Middle East, and the 
dilemmas that Seoul faced in the past when sending troops to the region. 
Part three analyzes South Korea’s political and diplomatic relations 
with the Middle East. Part four discusses the evolution of South Korea’s 
economic interaction with the Middle East. The final part looks at South 
Korea’s relations with Israel, and assesses the potential of economic and 
technological cooperation. 
THE PILLARS OF SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY
South Korea’s foreign policy is influenced by five internal and external 
constraints that have shaped the decision-making process of its Middle 
East policy:
1. The North Korean threat: North Korea has long been an 
important factor in South Korea’s foreign and security policy. The 
constant threat from Pyongyang has influenced Seoul’s security and 
foreign policies throughout the years, including its Middle East policy, 
and relations with its allies.
2. The alliance with the United States: The alliance with the 
United States, which defends South Korea from the North Korean threat, 
 MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES     I       9
has been an important pillar in South Korea’s defense and foreign policy 
throughout the years.6 This has influenced Seoul’s policy towards the 
Middle East, especially when Washington requested Korean troops in 
Iraq during the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, and more recently when it 
asked Korea to implement sanctions on Iran. 
3. The economy: The development of the South Korean economy 
was an important factor that influenced relations between South Korea 
and the Middle East, as it led Korean companies to search for markets 
outside of Korea. The Middle East, mainly the Persian Gulf and North 
Africa, became a favored market for South Korean companies due to 
the increased number and volume of projects they won there. The 
second economic factor was the increasing need for energy to fuel the 
development of the South Korean economy, which caused Seoul to 
become dependent on the Persian Gulf for its oil and gas needs.
4. Self-perception and status: South Korea has attained political, 
economic, and military power throughout the years, which has changed 
its self-perception regarding its regional and global status. If Seoul had 
focused mainly on East Asia and the US until the 1970s, from the 1980s 
it began reaching out to other regions and international organizations as 
well. This change brought with it the understanding that South Korea 
had become an important player in the global arena. Since the 1990s, 
South Korea has debated the meaning and essence of its new global role 
as a “middle power.”7 The debate on the role that Korea should play in 
regional conflicts includes the Middle East.
5. China: Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and South Korea in 1992, the economic relations between the two 
states improved. China has become South Korea’s biggest trade partner,8 
and trade with China is an important leverage on Korea’s economic policy 
in Asia. Beijing’s close relations with North Korea and its leverage on 
Pyongyang increase the importance of its influence on Seoul’s foreign 
and security policy in Asia. Currently China’s influence on Korea’s 
Middle East policy is relatively low in comparison to other factors, but 
will eventually increase due to rising competition on energy supply from 
the Middle East – with Japan in the mix as well – and an increase in 
China’s diplomatic and strategic role in the region.
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SECURITY
South Korea’s security relations with the Middle East were very limited 
until the 1990s. Seoul did not perceive military involvement in the 
Middle East as serving its political and economic interests, but rather 
as a detriment. Until the 1990s, security relations with the Middle East 
included only limited military and intelligence cooperation. An example 
of military cooperation is the military officers course that the Israeli 
Defense Forces held in Israel for South Korean military officers in the 
1970s. Two decades later, one of these officers became the national 
security advisor to the South Korean President.9 
Korea’s first military involvement in the Middle East was during the 
first Gulf War, which posed a dilemma for Seoul. Washington requested 
that Seoul send military forces to join the operation to free Kuwait 
from Iraqi occupation. Until then, the only time that South Korea had 
sent military forces outside of Korea was during the Vietnam War – to 
assist the US forces during the Cold War era – under Park Chung-hee’s 
presidency.10 The global arena and the Korean political arena in 1991 
differed completely from the Vietnam War era.
Rejecting President George H. W. Bush’s request to assist Washington 
in Operation Desert Storm might have adversely affected the alliance 
between Seoul and Washington, since American forces were – 
and  still  are  –  stationed  in  South  Korea  ,and  Seoul  was  expected  to 
consent to Washington’s request, as its protected ally. Moreover, the 
military operation to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was defined 
as a collective security action by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), as it was during the Korean War. The UNSC resolution 
legitimizing the military operation meant that South Korea had to send 
forces to Iraq if it wanted to be perceived as an important player in the 
global arena, and if it wanted the future assistance of the UNSC against 
North Korea. Seoul had to consider the implications of its involvement 
in the war on the Arab world, even though it was legitimized by the 
UNSC. Would the Arab world perceive South Korea as taking sides, 
costing Seoul the political neutrality that allowed it to trade with 
Middle Eastern states?
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Because of the overwhelming global support the US received, and the 
34 countries that sent military forces to the Persian Gulf to assist the 
UN forces, Seoul was able to cope with the pressure from Washington 
to participate in the war. Korea eventually sent only 341 soldiers – for 
logistic assistance – who did not participate in combat. Seoul was able to 
participate without being labeled by the Middle East as siding against the 
Persian Gulf states and shattering its “relatively ideal neutrality” – and 
without clashing with Washington. 
South Korea’s second military involvement in the Middle East was 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. International legitimacy in this 
case was more limited that the 1991 Gulf War, which is why Washington 
intensified the pressure it exerted on its Asian allies, South Korea and 
Japan.11 Washington demanded that Seoul and Tokyo send significant 
military forces to assist the US in the war and place them in the battle 
zone.
This time, Seoul was aware of the fact that refusing to send forces to Iraq 
would damage its relations with Washington and potentially lead to the 
withdrawal of a portion of the US forces stationed in South Korea.12 The 
alliance with Washington carried a price tag that Seoul had to pay. South 
Korea understood that sending its forces to Iraq was part of the cost of 
the alliance, which was in its best interest to protect. It understood that 
although it was able to stave off some of the pressure from Washington 
during the First Gulf War, 2003 was a different ball game; it would have 
to send forces to Iraq. Another factor that influenced Seoul’s decision 
was the perception that sending soldiers to Iraq would allow it to be 
perceived as a “middle power” in the global arena. 
Seoul eventually sent military units to Iraq, but was unwilling to comply 
with all of Washington’s requests. The US demanded that Korea send 
troops to a combat zone in Mosul, Iraq. Seoul opposed this demand, and 
in 2004 dispatched 3,500 soldiers, the Zaytun Division, to non-combat 
zones in Irbil and Kirkuk,13 where they worked mainly on civilian tasks, 
including local civilian reconstruction projects. These soldiers were the 
third-largest foreign military force in Iraq (surpassed only by the US 
and UK; Japan, for example, only sent 600 soldiers). The South Korean 
government publicly emphasized the civilian nature of its forces14 so as 
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not to be tagged in the Arab world as an anti-Muslim country, an image 
that might adversely affect its economic relations with the Middle East. 
Seoul’s concerns about the potential effects of its involvement in Iraq on 
trade with the Persian Gulf states were refuted. Since then, South Korea 
has dispatched its military forces as part of the UN peace-keeping forces 
to the Western Sahara, East Timor, and other places. The South Koreans 
realized that playing a more significant role in the Middle East requires 
involvement beyond the economic and political realms and playing a 
military role, albeit not as part of active combat units. Sending forces to 
the Middle East as part of the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)15 
allows Seoul to gain legitimacy without taking sides in the Middle East 
conflicts.
Seoul’s decision to send 356 soldiers, the Dongmyeong military unit, to 
southern Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) in the wake of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, signaled 
another change in Seoul’s regional policy: a willingness to participate 
in a regional PKO without fearing trade repercussions.16 South Korea 
kept its forces in southern Lebanon even after Italy withdrew its forces 
in the aftermath of an attack.17 If the instability in Syria spills over into 
southern Lebanon and the safety of its forces is jeopardized, Seoul might 
withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon. 
South Korea’s security relations in the Middle East will continue to be 
relatively limited compared to its economic relations with the region. 
Seoul will continue to send its military forces to participate in the UN 
PKO, including in the Middle East, and understands that in the long run 
its middle power status will influence military involvement in global 
conflicts. Currently, Seoul prefers to limit its military involvement and 
use its soft power to influence the international arena. 
The Middle East’s currently-destabilizing security reflects on South 
Korea’s bilateral security relations with the US. Washington’s policy 
towards the security crises in Syria and Egypt, its handling of the 
Iranian nuclear crisis, and its hesitations to use military force reflect 
on its commitment to its allies in Asia. Sources in South Korea started 
to question Washington’s devotion to Asian security, mainly after its 
problematic policy in the Middle East.18 
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DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS
After focusing exclusively on Asia during its first decades, South Korea 
became an active player in the international arena in the late 1980s.19 
South Korea only became a member of the United Nations in the early 
1990s and has since joined global and Asian international organizations. 
In the Middle East, Seoul focused on economic relations and preferred 
not to get involved in the political arena. 
The Middle East peace process allowed Seoul to get politically involved 
in the region without taking sides. Seoul decided to initiate civilian 
projects in the Palestinian (PA) and get more involved in the peace 
process between Israel and the PA. This does not imply that Seoul will 
one day become a mediator between Israel and the PA, like the US or 
EU, but that it has demonstrated a more active political role in Middle 
Eastern affairs. Seoul lacks leverage in the Middle East, which limits the 
role it can play in the peace process. Compared to Japan, South Korea’s 
financial assistance to the PA and its financial involvement in Middle 
Eastern regional cooperation projects – as part of confidence-building 
measures between Israel and its neighbors – is limited. Seoul continues 
to donate funds and build projects in the PA. For example, in 2012 the 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) gave the PA $5.5 
million the greatest amount of financial support among other Middle 
East countries in building projects – such as education and healthcare – 
followed by Jordan, Yemen, and Iran.20 
The “Arab Spring” led Seoul to understand that it cannot intervene 
militarily in internal conflicts in Middle East countries, even though 
some of its financial assets are at risk there. In Libya, Seoul considered 
evacuating South Korean workers but not intervening militarily. 
Although the South Korean government views the “Arab Spring” as 
a concern for its interests in the Middle East, it concurrently sees an 
opportunity for soft power diplomacy. Diplomats in the Foreign Affairs 
Office and other agencies have stated that Seoul could contribute its 
knowledge and experience to the Middle Eastern states, especially to the 
new regimes that were established as a result of the “Arab Spring.”21 
They argue that the knowledge and experience that South Korea amassed 
in its own democratization and economic development can assist these 
14  I SOUTH KOREA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY 
new regimes. For example, the Korea Foundation has projects for leaders 
in developing countries that teach them about democratization, economic 
development, and leadership.22 The Korea International Cooperation 
Agency and the Korean Development Institute (KDI)23 have programs 
that can assist these states in creating projects to develop their economy, 
education, and other important sectors. Its political neutrality towards 
Middle Eastern conflicts is a result of Korea’s past; unlike Japan, Britain, 
and other imperialist states, Korea never had a colonialist ideology, nor 
did it conquer territories beyond the Korean Peninsula. The absence of 
a superpower image gives South Korea an advantage over other states 
in offering assistance to Middle Eastern countries. It can be involved 
politically and diplomatically in the Middle East at a low cost, without 
being tagged as supporting one of the sides of the conflicts or interfering 
in the political arena of the major players (such as Washington and 
Moscow). Soft power policy and extensive economic cooperation with 
the Middle East have enabled South Korea to positively develop its 
middle power status in the region.
ECONOMY AND TRADE
In South Korea, the economy plays a vital role in its foreign relations with 
the Middle East. The economy influences political, and even security, 
relations between Seoul and Middle Eastern countries. In order to minimize 
potential conflict between its political and economic interests in the region, 
which might even lead to disputes with Middle Eastern states and even 
the US, South Korea has developed a two-pronged policy that allows it to 
maximize its economic interests with minimal political cost. The first part 
of the policy is to keep politics and economy separate. This allows South 
Korea to trade without having to pay a political price or be constrained 
by the political rules of the game.24 This policy has enabled South Korea 
to trade with and invest in North Korea, and to trade with Middle Eastern 
states when at war or under sanction, such as Iran and Iraq. The second 
element in its policy is to remain neutral in regional conflicts. By taking a 
stand, Seoul would not be able to continue to trade with both sides. This 
policy enabled South Korea to trade with both Iran and Iraq during the Iran-
Iraq war in the 1980s. By maintaining its neutral policy, Seoul is perceived 
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as a state devoid of a political agenda, unlike some of the American or 
Russian companies that might serve hidden political agendas. 
However, while the Middle East offers business opportunities for Korean 
conglomerates, it might concurrently pose challenges, especially in the 
event of regional wars. Seoul’s economic policy might face another 
obstacle when its regional interests do not coincide with Washington’s, 
which might lead the US to pressure it to change its policy, as was the 
case with Iran. 
South Korea’s Economic Interest in the Middle East
The Middle East’s importance to the South Korean economy began in the 
late 1960s with the development of the Korean economy under President 
Park Chung-hee.25 The Korean chaebols (business conglomerate) were 
searching for markets outside of Korea, and the Middle East was an 
excellent region to reach out to. The South Korean government saw 
this outreach as an opportunity to develop the economy. It subsequently 
supported these companies with loans and tax deductions, and assured 
Middle Eastern countries that the chaebols would build the projects at 
a low cost. Even now, Seoul continues to assist these conglomerates in 
pursuing and conducting business in the Middle East.
In the 1960s and 1970s, several factors allowed South Korean companies 
to be highly competitive in the Middle East construction market. These 
included experienced and cheap labor, the financial backing of the Seoul 
government, and the companies’ ability to build large-scale projects.26 
However, the more developed the South Korean economy became, the 
more dependent it became on Middle Eastern oil, gas, and projects.
South Korean companies such as Hyundai, Dong Ah Industrial, Daewoo, 
and others27 won contracts throughout the 1980s in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and other countries in the region worth more than $3 billion.28 
These projects enabled South Korea to provide more than one million 
workers in the Middle East in the 1970s and 80s.29
South Korea’s dependency on Middle Eastern oil increased throughout 
the years to 85 percent, and almost 74 percent of its natural gas is imported 
from the Middle East (Table 1).30 The oil embargo in the mid-1970s,31 the 
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Arab boycott on any company that traded with Israel, and Washington’s 
demand to pursue sanctions on Iran over the previous decade increased 
Seoul’s sensitivity towards trade with Israel and its political stand in 
Middle Eastern conflicts.32 
Table 2: South Korea oil sources in the Middle East (2011)33
 Saudi
Arabia Kuwait Iran Iraq Qatar
United
 Arab 
Emirates
33% 14% 10% 9% 9% 9%
In the 1980s, South Korea’s trade with the Middle East was influenced 
by the Iran-Iraq war, which led to a decline in the trade between Korea 
and these two states. Yet Korea was able to continue trading with the two 
states due to its political neutrality. Another factor that influenced the 
decline of trade was the drop in oil prices from $48 per barrel in 1980 to 
$12 in 1985, which led to fewer projects offered to foreign companies by 
the Middle Eastern states.
South Korea and other countries waited for the day after the war. They 
estimated that once the war ended, Iran and Iraq would have to invest 
billions of dollars in reconstruction projects to rehabilitate destroyed areas. 
Shortly after the end of the war, the South Korean firm Daelim signed a $250 
million contract to develop the Nar-Kangan gas field refinery in Iran.34 In 
Iraq, President Saddam Hussein offered reconstruction and infrastructure 
project bids worth billions of dollars.35 Samsung and Hyundai were two 
of the large Korean companies to win billion dollar construction projects 
in Iraq. However, these projects were short-lived. Saddam’s decision to 
invade Kuwait in August 1990 threatened South Korean projects in Iraq 
and the oil supply to South Korea from the Persian Gulf.
The Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003 raised concerns in Seoul of what the 
economic and political implications of its involvement in these operations 
might be. Table 2 demonstrates that South Korea’s involvement in the 
two wars did not affect trade between South Korea and Iraq, and had no 
implications on trade with other Middle Eastern states. 
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Table 3: South Korea’s trade with Middle Eastern states 
1990-2012 ($ million)36
State 1990-1999 2000-2012
Iran 18,113 74,369
Iraq 497 21,252
Israel 4,821 14,409
Kuwait 11,654 74,339
Libya 2,177 6,160
Oman 11,301 41,279
Qatar 4,438 76,823
Saudi Arabia 56,020 214,154
United Arab Emirates 28,303 139,697
South Korean Trade Projects in Light of the “Arab Spring”
While some parts of the Middle East were unstable due to the “Arab 
Spring” – which broke out in early 2011 – in other parts of the Middle 
East, South Korean companies continued to win contracts and billions 
of dollars in projects. In 2011, South Korean companies secured the 
largest amount of orders among foreign builders operating in Saudi 
Arabia.37 The years 2012-2013 in particular are excellent examples 
of the importance of the Middle East to the South Korean economy. 
In 2012, Hyundai Rotem Co. secured a $353 million order to supply 
railcars to Egypt;38 LS Cable and System, a South Korean power 
network builder, won a $110 million order to supply large cables for 
three Middle Eastern countries;39 Samsung Engineering secured a $2.47 
billion deal from the United Arab Emirates;40 and Hyundai Engineering 
& Construction Co. won a $1.5 billion alumina refinery order in Saudi 
Arabia.41 The multi-billion dollar contracts and the huge construction 
and infrastructure projects that Korean companies won explain why 
the Middle East, mainly the Persian Gulf, is so important to Korea. In 
August 2013, for example, Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. 
won a $709 million contract to build natural gas processing facilities 
in Iraq’s Akkas gas field.42 The South Korean companies decided to 
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accept these projects despite losing millions of dollars in Iraq following 
the Kuwait invasion, and with a complete awareness of the precarious 
stability in some parts of Iraq. 
An additional indication of the Middle East’s economic importance is the 
August 2013 agreement between South Korea and Bahrain to establish 
a joint committee for boosting bilateral economic cooperation.43 
The upgrade of economic relations stands as another step in the 
institutionalization of economic relations between South Korea and the 
Middle East. It began with Seoul’s decision to evaluate a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between South Korea and the United Arab Emirates.44 
Until recently, Seoul only considered signing FTAs with Asian countries 
and the US. The decision to sign an FTA with the UAE, and consider 
adding Bahrain as well, marks the change in Seoul’s economic and 
political interests towards the Middle East, mainly the Persian Gulf. 
While in 2012 South Korea did not secure as many construction projects 
as it had hoped in parts of the Middle East, as a result of the “Arab Spring” 
and the difficult competition with other foreign companies, orders from 
the oil-rich Middle East countries topped the list with $36.9 billion worth 
of construction projects.45
South Korea was one of many countries to be surprised by the eruption 
of the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East. The South Korean government 
was concerned for the safety of the South Korean workers.46 President 
Lee Myung-bak said that “[the government] should use every possible 
means to protect our people and workers at companies operating 
there.”47 The instability in Egypt led the South Korean government to 
evaluate the safety of the 1,000 Koreans in Egypt.48 The “Arab Spring” 
threatened not only the security of South Korean workers, but also the 
multi-billion dollar projects that Korean companies were building in 
the Middle East.49 Seoul was also concerned about the implications 
of the “Arab Spring” on the cost of regional oil, and began preparing 
a contingency plan for its oil supply.50 In the event of a destabilized 
Middle East or acute Iran crisis, South Korea could consider importing 
oil from Middle Eastern countries that did not undergo upheaval, 
Central Asian countries, or Russia.51 
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The “Arab Spring” raises doubts and concerns in Seoul about the 
stability in the Middle East and the possibilities for trade with 
the region. Yet it did not prevent South Korean companies and the 
government from seeking additional projects in the Middle East. An 
example is the meeting between the foreign ministers of South Korea 
and Tunisia in April 2012 to discuss forging closer bilateral cooperation 
in the fields of economy and trade.52 South Korean Foreign Minister 
Kim Sung-hwan said in February 2012 that he expects construction 
and other industries in the Middle East to flourish, and urged the 
South Korean government to support the Korean firms. After his visit 
through Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, he 
declared that “the Middle East is poised for a second boom.”53 Minister 
Kim, other government voices, and leaders of top Korean companies 
urged the Seoul government to create three initiatives to assist South 
Korean companies in coping with the increasing number and volume 
of projects in the Middle East, and with the instability in some parts 
of the region. The first initiative was to establish an organization to 
assist South Korean companies in promoting their business in Africa, 
including Egypt, despite the continent’s precarious stability.54 The 
second was to establish a $500 million industrial plant building fund to 
help local builders win overseas contracts. The government understood 
that South Korean companies would need additional assistance from 
the government in building huge constructions projects in the Persian 
Gulf and other parts of the Middle East.55 The third was to open a 
new regional support center for Korean construction companies in 
Abu Dhabi, which will assist them in winning multi-billion dollars in 
regional construction projects.56
The United Arab Emirates
In March 2012, President Lee Myung-bak praised the contract that 
South Korean companies won to develop oil fields in the United Arab 
Emirates. He defined it as a milestone that would place the resource-
scarce nation in the ranks of major oil-developing nations, which could 
open the door to larger contracts in the region.57 This project was another 
of South Korea’s landmark achievements in the Middle East. However, 
South Korea’s greatest achievement was the UAE civilian nuclear energy 
contract. The South Korean industry boasts numerous achievements in 
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the global market in many industries, including ship building and high 
tech, but Seoul wanted to enter the “Ivy League” of the civilian nuclear 
energy power plant market, which was mainly controlled by the US, 
Russia, France, and Japan. South Korea competed for the UAE nuclear 
power energy contract and won. Winning the $40 billion project was an 
important acknowledgement for the South Korean industry and served 
as an entry ticket to the global nuclear power plant market, with the 
potential for billions of dollars in projects worldwide.58 Seoul thought 
that this contract would serve as a springboard to other countries in the 
region that might consider building nuclear power plants (such as Jordan 
and Turkey). Seoul won the contract against all odds, but its plans to 
secure additional contracts in the Middle East did not materialize due 
to tough competition with Japan and France and the onset of the “Arab 
Spring,” which delayed some of the investments by these states. 
Iran 
In 2010, trade between Iran and South Korea amounted to $11.5 billion. 
A year later trade increased to $18.4 billion. Iran became an important 
Middle East trade partner for South Korea, and Korean companies were 
awarded multi-million dollar construction and infrastructure contracts.59 
Seoul hoped that its separation of politics and economy would allow it to 
continue trading with Iran, even during the sanctions. 
Seoul initially attempted to bypass some of the sanctions, but Washington 
upped the pressure, forcing Seoul to enforce the sanctions and limit its 
trade with Iran.60 It even instructed South Korean companies to limit their 
business in Iran,61 which they did, even when Tehran threatened that this 
policy might have implications on the 3,000 South Korean companies 
located in Iran.62 Seoul even began searching for alternative oil sources 
in preparation for the day when the sanctions on Iran would prevent South 
Korea from importing oil from Iran. Seoul has tried to balance politics and 
economy, knowing that the US and the UNSC will ultimately determine 
the boundaries of trade with Iran. If they increase sanctions on Iran, the 
trade between Iran and South Korea will continue to decrease.
Over the past decade, South Korea began to diversify its exports to 
the Middle East by selling not only civilian products but also military 
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equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the South 
Korean T-50 Golden Eagle training jet, and patrol boats to countries 
such as the UAE, Iraq, and even Israel.63 Israel eventually preferred 
Italian jets to the Korean T-50. The cancellation of the T-50s did not 
prevent Korea from purchasing military equipment from Israel, such as 
the Israeli Spike missile to deal with the North Korean attacks.64 The 
South Korean military equipment sales to the Middle East are minor 
moneymakers compared to its civilian trade with the region, and do not 
signal a change in Seoul’s policy to the region. South Korea, unlike the 
US and Russia, does not perceive its military sales to the Middle East 
as a mechanism to influence the strategic arena, but rather as another 
lucrative industry. 
Over the past two years, South Korean companies have won an 
increasing number and volume of projects in the Middle East. Other 
than the Iranian situation, where new sanctions might affect the trade 
between the two states, trade between Seoul and the Middle East is 
booming. The “Arab Spring” raises concerns in Seoul about the 
implications on the safety of its workers in the Middle East and the 
volume of trade; however, Seoul sees it as an opportunity to increase 
the trade with these states, which might need to invest more money in 
construction and infrastructure projects to stabilize the new regimes. 
The South Korean chaebols’ extensive experience in these projects 
makes them the best candidates for the job.
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
Relations between South Korea and Israel demonstrate the influence 
of Seoul’s economic interests in the Middle East. The two nations 
established diplomatic relations in 1962, but the lack of common political 
and economic interests resulted in low-profile economic and diplomatic 
relations between them for many years. The oil embargo in the mid-
1970s and the Arab boycott on any company that traded with Israel 
alerted South Korea to the fact that its relations with Israel might carry 
a very expensive price tag, resulting in Seoul’s high sensitivity towards 
trade and diplomatic relations with Israel.65 
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Israel closed its embassy in Seoul in 1978 due to budget cuts and a lack 
of understanding of Seoul’s constraints on its relations with Israel. South 
Korea attempted to explain its complex policy constraints to Israel to 
prevent the embassy closure, but to no avail. This led to deteriorated 
relations between the countries, and to an indirect improvement of 
relations between Korea and the Arab states.66 It took Israel more than 
a decade to secure permission to reopen its embassy in Seoul, which it 
did in 1992. One of the main reasons for the lengthy hiatus was Seoul’s 
concerns about the implications of reopening the embassy on its trade 
with the rest of the Middle East.
The most remarkable indication of South Korea’s sensitivity towards its 
relations with Israel can be seen in the official diplomatic visits index. 
South Korean political leaders abstained from visiting Israel throughout 
the years, fearing repercussions for its relations within the Middle East. 
Although South Korean presidents and ministers frequently visit the 
countries in the Middle East with whom Korea has economic interests, 
they have not landed in Israel since establishing diplomatic relations 
in 1962. Israeli officials, on the other hand, have visited South Korea 
several times. One of the most important Israeli official visits to Korea 
was Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s visit in 1994, which led to improved 
economic relations, as Table 3 demonstrates.67 
Table 4: South Korea’s trade with Israel 1980-2010 ($ million)68
Year 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-11 2012
131 32 674 4,147 4,910 9,499 2,361
South Korea’s diplomatic and economic “embargo” on Israel partially 
ended in the early 1990s, with the start of the Middle East peace process. 
South Korean companies began exporting to Israel and opened local 
branches there, but even then the South Korean president or prime 
minister never visited Israel. The fear of another Arab boycott is a 
constant concern for the Korean government. In comparison, Chinese 
leaders and Japanese prime ministers have visited Israel several times.
Israel understands that it cannot compete with the multi-billion dollar 
contracts the South Korean companies can secure in the Middle East, 
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mainly in the Persian Gulf. However, Seoul and Jerusalem understand 
that mutual cooperation can benefit both parties in the civilian and 
military industries. In the civilian industries, Israel is the only Middle 
Eastern state where South Korean conglomerates opened research and 
development centers; Samsung, LG, and POSCO69 are examples of the 
technological cooperation between the two states. Even President Park 
Guen-hye said that the Israeli “Startup Nation” is a role model that 
South Korea should learn from in order to prioritize R&D and startups.70 
However, even this cooperation is relatively limited compared to the 
trade with the Persian Gulf states. 
The military cooperation between the two states bears the potential of 
billions of dollars in contracts. Both states face a military threat across their 
borders, have experienced war, and face a constant missile threat. However, 
this potential faces three obstacles that limit it from being fulfilled.
One obstacle is South Korea’s alliance with the US. Washington expects 
Seoul to purchase military equipment from American companies, and 
wants the South Korean military to have the same equipment as its own 
forces that are stationed in Korea. Another obstacle is Washington’s 
limitation of Israeli companies from competing in South Korea. 
The US will not allow Israel to bid in South Korea if Israeli military 
equipment contains US components, as was the case with the IAI EL/M 
2075-Phalcon. A third obstacle is the internal political and economic 
interests in South Korea that influence weapons transfers.
Israeli companies had to overcome not just the South Korean market 
constraints, but the Americans as well. Israeli companies were able to 
bypass some of these obstacles through joint projects with South Korean 
or American companies, and Israeli firms are able to sell equipment that is 
completely Israeli-made. Elbit, Elop, Elta, IAI, and other Israeli companies 
signed millions of dollars in contracts to sell military equipment to South 
Korea.71 North Korea’s military provocations and the Israeli experience 
with the Iron Dome missile defense system has created a new potential 
for cooperation between the two states,72 especially after President Park 
Geun-hye’s October 2013 declaration to “establish a strong deterrence 
against North Korea until it gives up its nuclear programs, and makes 
the right choice for its residents and peace on the Korean Peninsula.”73 
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This statement creates the possibility for increased military cooperation 
between South Korea and Israel.
South Korea’s economic interests in the region will continue to constrain 
itself in its relations with Israel. Its main priority will be maintaining the 
billions of dollars of trade and contracts that South Korean companies 
are winning in the Middle East. Moreover, as long as the US constrains 
the military trade between South Korea and Israel, the nature and scope 
of military trade and cooperation between Seoul and Jerusalem will be 
limited, without reaching its multi-billion dollar potential. 
CONCLUSION
South Korea’s Middle East policy, which includes political neutrality, a 
separation between politics and economy, and a cautious policy towards 
Israel, has allowed Seoul to maximize its economic interests in the region 
throughout the years. This has paved the way for South Korean companies 
to compete and win billions of dollars of projects in the Middle East since 
the 1970s. 
The “Arab Spring” took the South Korean government by surprise and 
led to a decrease trade with some Middle Eastern states. However, South 
Korea’s concern is that the “Arab Spring” will spill over to the Persian 
Gulf and jeopardize South Korea’s billions of dollars of construction 
projects there. More concerning is a disruption of the oil and gas flow 
to South Korea from the Persian Gulf, in which the regional turmoil will 
incur an enormous cost for the South Korean economy.
South Korean-Israeli political relations will not be upgraded as long as 
Seoul is concerned about how the Arab Middle East states will react. 
This means that the South Korean President is not expected to visit Israel 
any time soon. The billions of dollars of contracts with the Middle East, 
mainly the Persian Gulf states, are too important for Seoul to risk. While 
the diplomatic-political relations remain at the current level, the military 
cooperation between the two states will continue to improve, as long as 
Washington does not constrain it.
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The Middle East peace process offers an opportunity for South Korea to 
upgrade its political and diplomatic role in the region.74 By increasing 
its political involvement in the Middle East peace process, Seoul can 
establish its middle power status not just in Asia but in the Middle East 
as well. It will do so by increasing support for humanitarian and peace-
building projects – making Korean companies a part of the peace process 
– and through soft power, which will allow Korea to develop its new 
regional status with positive diplomacy, while remaining politically 
neutral in the region. 
Iran’s nuclear program poses a conundrum for South Korea if the nuclear 
crisis deteriorates due to a military attack, increased sanctions, or an 
Iranian nuclear test. Washington, and even the Persian Gulf states, might 
call upon Seoul to take a stand, in which case Seoul will not be able to 
sit on the fence. The implications might apply to the Korean Peninsula as 
well. If North Korea perceives the attack on Iran as a direct threat, then 
South Korea’s dilemma will become even more complicated.
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